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Perhaps the most significant and controversial research pro-
gram among contemporary criminal theorists is the investigation of
the advantages and limitations of applications of the distinction be-
tween justification and excuse.' Some theorists exhibit almost un-
qualified enthusiasm that careful attention to this distinction can
illuminate any number of intractable disputes :in the substantive
criminal law.2 Others remain skeptical and cautious,3 while still
others neglect this research program altogether.
4
It is highly unlikely that this ongoing debate can be resolved by
a single conclusive argument. Instead, it must be decided by attend-
* Associate Professor of Philosophy, Rutgers University. J.D., Ohio State Univer-
sity, 1976; Ph.D., Ohio State University, 1976.
1 The relevant commentary is growing rapidly: "[e]noughjustification-excuse liter-
ature now exists to merit the publication of a bibliography." Dressler, Justfications and
Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1159 n.16
(1987). Although relatively new to Anglo-American thought, this distinction has been
most fully developed in the legal systems of West Germany, Italy, Spain, Greece, Latin
America, andJapan. See Hassemer,Justification and Excuse in Criminal Law: Theses and Com-
ments, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 573, 573.
2 The most outspoken champions of this distinction in Anglo-American law are
George Fletcher and Paul Robinson. They have defended the usefulness of the distinc-
tion between justification and excuse in a series of books and articles. See G. FLETCHER,
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw (1978); P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAw DEFENSES (1984).
3 See Dressler, New Thoughts about the Concept ofJustification in the Criminal Law: A Cri-
tique of Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REV. 61 (1984); Greenawalt, Distin-
guishing Justifications from Excuses, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1986, at 89
[hereinafter Greenawalt,Justifications and Excuses]; Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders ofJus-
tification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897 (1984) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Perplexing
Borders]; Morawetz, Reconstructing the Criminal Defenses: The Significance ofJustification, 77 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 277 (1986).
4 The efforts to suppress the distinction between justification and excuse are dis-
cussed in Fletcher, The Individuation of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269 (1974).
The distinction is almost totally ignored in the otherwise impressive ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME ANDJUSTCE (S. Kadish ed. 1983), leading Fletcher to complain that the appropri-
ate reaction to its contributions is comparable to what "one would have to an article
written today about tort theory that failed to acknowledge the implications of the eco-
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ing to the several uses to which the distinction has been put. If the
distinction can help shed light on a few stubborn problems in sub-
stantive criminal law, the program will have demonstrated its
importance.
5
This Article examines whether applications of this distinction
are helpful in resolving what will be called the problem of accesso-
rial liability. 6 The issue is as follows: Suppose that a defendant (D2)
assists another (DI) in apparently violating a criminal law, but that
D1 has a valid defense from liability.7 To what extent does the lia-
nomic analysis of law." Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARv. L. REV. 949, 957
(1985).
English commentators are generally more critical of attempts to formulate and ap-
ply a taxonomy of criminal law defenses:
The distinction between the definitional and defence elements of a crime .. .is
impossible to draw satisfactorily. A rule creating a defence merely supplies additional
details of the scope of the offence. To regard the offence as subsisting independently
of its limitations and qualifications is unrealistic. The defence is a negative condi-
tion of the offence, and is therefore an integral part of it.
G. WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 138 (2d ed. 1983).
5 Fletcher maintains that recognition of the distinction between justification and ex-
cuse "could have concrete consequences" in
at least four areas of legal dispute .... First, it is of critical importance in deciding
when external facts, standing alone, should have an exculpatory effect. Secondly, it
might bear on the analysis of permissible vagueness in legal norms. Thirdly, it
might bear on the allocation of power between the legislature and judiciary in the
continuing development of the criminal law. And fourthly, it might be of impor-
tance in analyzing the exculpatory effect of mistakes.
G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 555.
Although this Article confines its attention to the problem of third party assistance,
the general remarks about justification and excuse offered here are potentially applica-
ble to several of these other problems. In particular, the problem of third party interfer-
ence lends itself to a somewhat comparable analysis.
6 Accessories, unlike perpetrators, are those whose liability for an offense is deriva-
tive. This Article focuses upon those accessories commonly described as aiders-and-
abettors rather than as instigators. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 637.
7 It is unclear whether a defendant whose conduct is justified has actually committed
a criminal offense because of uncertainty about whether the elements of offenses in-
clude, perhaps as "implicit negative elements," the absence of justifications. Commit-
ment on this difficult issue is avoided by saying that persons whose conduct is justified
apparently commit criminal offenses.
Whether or not a defendant whose conduct is justified has actually committed a
criminal offense depends upon which of two incompatible views of justifications is
adopted. According to the "implicit elements" approach, a defendant who acts under a
justification cannot commit the offense charged. His conduct may have satisfied each of
the explicit elements of a given offense, but complete offenses are comprised of all their
elements; unless the conduct of the defendant satisfies the implicit as well as the explicit
elements, he has not committed the offense. According to the "license" approach, justi-
fications are construed as licenses or privileges to commit an offense. A defendant who
acts under ajustification can commit the offense charged, although the presumption that
the offense constitutes a legal wrong is rebutted. See D. HUSAK, PHILOSOPHY OF CIMI-
NAL LAw 190-92 (1987).
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bility of D2 depend upon what kind of defense D1 possesses for his
apparent violation?
It is clear that an all-or-nothing answer to this question must be
rejected. Suppose that D1 acts in self-defense in repelling an un-
lawful aggressor. Surely D2 has a defense if he-assists D1 in his ef-
forts.8 But suppose that D1 attacks an innocent victim, and is
acquitted on grounds of insanity. Surely D2, if sane, has no defense
if he assists D1. In each example, D1 is acquitted, but the conse-
quences for D2 differ. What accounts for this difference?
A number of theorists contend that this question can best be
answered by invoking distinctions between various criminal law de-
fensesg-justifications and excuses in particular.O According to
these theorists, the issue of whether D2 should be allowed to assist
D1 depends upon whether DI 's defense is categorized as ajustifica-
tion or an excuse. If D 's conduct is justified, D2 may assist him and
benefit from his defense. But if D1 's conduct is excused, D2 may
not assist him or benefit from his defense.1 The application of this
principle to the above examples is alleged to be straightforward;
since self-defense is a justification, accessories may assist those who
act in self-defense.12 Since insanity is an excuse, assistance by acces-
8 It is likely that additional conditions must be satisfied before D2 may benefit from
D1 's defense. Perhaps D2 must know of the existence of the circumstances that give rise
to DI 's defense and act because of those circumstances. See Robinson, A Theory ofJustifi-
cation: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 279
(1975); Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson, 23 UCLA L.
REV. 293 (1975).
9 There is some disagreement about how many distinctions a complete taxonomy of
defenses should recognize. Robinson argues for five categories. 1 P. ROBINSON, supra
note 2, at 70, 105.
10 SeeJ. DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW (1987); G. FLETCHER, supra note 2;
P. ROBINSON, supra note 2.
11 Perhaps the clearest statement of this position has been written by J. DRESSLER,
supra note 10, at 189-90:
Suppose that D wishes to perform conduct A. She needs assistance to commit
A. Should X assist A? If she does, what is her criminal responsibility for her assist-
ance? The answer to this question may depend on whether conduct A is justified,
excused, or neither.
If conduct A is justified, then D has committed a proper act. X should be ac-
quitted as an accomplice in the commission of ajustified act. Thus, if X provides D
with the gun to assist her in killing V in justifiable self-defense, X is guilty of no
crime.
Suppose, however, that D kills V due to an insane delusion. X, a sane person,
provides D with the gun used in the crime. Although D may be acquitted on the
basis of insanity, no logical reason should preclude convicting X of the murder in
which she sanely assisted. After all, a wrongful act has occurred-the death of V.
The fact that D is relieved of responsibility due to her mental illness should not
preclude convicting a sane person of assisting in the commission of the harmful act.
12 This example may be somewhat oversimplified, since self-defense does not always




sories is not permitted.1 3 Some theorists express this position by
contending that excuses, unlike justifications, are personal to those
who possess them in the sense that they cannot be shared or trans-
ferred to others.14
Why should D2 's fate be influenced by whether D1 has a de-
fense and by how that defense is categorized? Those theorists who
believe this distinction to be useful argue that justified conduct does
not (all things considered) violate a prohibitory norm; it is objec-
tively right, and it cannot be wrong for others to assist in conduct
that is objectively right. Any basis for proscribing such assistance
cannot refer to the original prohibitory norm because, ex hypothesi,
that norm has not been transgressed. Excused conduct, on the
other hand, violates a prohibitory norm; it is objectively wrong, and
it cannot be right for others to assist in conduct that is objectively
wrong. The basis for proscribing such assistance can and does refer
to the original prohibitory norm. Thus a defendant may be con-
victed as an accessory to conduct that is excused, but not to conduct
that is justified.
15
The application of the distinction between justification and ex-
cuse offers a promising solution in the above examples. In these
cases, however, there is little need for a theory; reasonable persons
could be expected to concur in the outcomes regardless of whatever
theoretical differences may divide them. The value of the distinc-
tion lies in its application to examples about which our pre-theoreti-
cal intuitions are likely to be confused and ambivalent. 16 Suppose
that V threatens to bloody the nose of one of DI 's children unless
D1 burglarizes X's house. Unable to accomplish this result alone,
D1 explains his predicament to D2, his sympathetic friend. D2 pro-
poses to lend a ladder to D1, so that he can enter the house through
a second story window. 17 D1 's conduct falls under the defense of
duress, but can D2 benefit from DI 's defense? D2 did not act under
13 Again, this example may be somewhat oversimplified since insanity does not al-
ways function as an excuse, but as a denial of culpability inherent in an offense. Only
when volitional disabilities are present is insanity clearly an excuse.
14 See, e.g., G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 762 ("Excuses, in contrast [to justifications],
are always personal to the actor."); J. DRESSLER, supra note 10, at 190 ("Generally speak-
ing, justifications are universalized whereas excuses are individuated.").
15 G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 762.
16 Independent corroboration of the utility of the distinction between justification
and excuse is allegedly derived from the fact that our intuitions about the permissibility
of assistance by accessories are most ambivalent in those very cases in which we are
uncertain about whether the defense of the accused qualifies as a justification or an ex-
cuse. See 1 P. ROBINSON, supra note 2, at 105-16.
17 Frequently it is difficult to distinguish the aiding-and-abetting of an accessory,
which is a kind of derivative liability, from joint perpetration. For a discussion of some
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duress; he was not "coerced" by a "threat," as most formulations of
duress require. 18 D2 's motives for assisting DI were friendship and
sympathy. The commentators cited above would determine
whether D2 has a defense by first identifying what kind of defense DI
possesses. Duress is almost always construed as an excuse rather
than as ajustification; thus Dl 's conduct is "objectively wrong," and
D2's assistance is legally prohibited. According to this school of
thought, if D2 's assistance is to be allowed, an argument would have
to establish that Dl 's conduct is "objectively right," and therefore
justified.
A number of problems lurk behind this deceptively simple ap-
proach. Although a few observations about the concept of excuse
will be offered, the focus in this Article is almost entirely on difficul-
ties that surround the concept of justification. Part II refines the
concept ofjustification and argues that this category is better under-
stood as permissible rather than as commendable conduct. Part III
points out the deficiencies in the substantive theory ofjustifications
proposed by those commentators who have been most enthusiastic
about applying the distinction between various defenses to substan-
tive problems in the criminal law. Part IV examines the implications
of the conclusions reached in II and III for the problem of accesso-
rial liability. In sum, the application of the distinction between justi-
fication and excuse to the problem of accessorial liability is more
problematic than has been supposed.
II. THE CONCEPT OF JUSTIFICATIONS
To what extent is the categorization of DI 's defense dispositive
of the issue of how D2 should be treated? This question cannot be
answered without carefully attending to the distinction between jus-
tification and excuse. This distinction has been a source of contro-
versy among theorists.' 9 Confusion has derived largely from the
failure to distinguish between two issues about justifications and ex-
cuses: the first problem is simply to define each concept; the second
is to defend a theory of what conduct is justified or excused.20 The
first problem is conceptual; the second is substantive. 2' Each will be
of these complications, see Schreiber, Problems of Justification aizd Excuse in the Setting of
Accessorial Conduct, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 611.
18 See 2 P. ROBINSON, supra note 2, at 348.
19 See D. HUSAK, supra note 7, at 190-92.
20 Only when these two issues are resolved is there hope that a third question can be
answered: whether particular defenses-necessity or duress, for example-should be
categorized as justifications or excuses. Unfortunately, commentators' obsessesion with
this issue has distracted them from more fundamental concerns.




Although there has been considerable debate about defini-
tions, 22 most theorists should find the following accounts accept-
able. At least two grounds may give rise to a defense after a person
has apparently violated a criminal law. First, properties or charac-
teristics of the defendant's act may create a defense. Second,
properties or characteristics of the defendant himself may create a de-
fense. Justifications are defenses that arise from properties or char-
acteristics of acts; excuses are defenses that arise from properties or
characteristics of actors. 23 A defendant is justified when his conduct
is not legally wrongful, even though it apparently violates a criminal
law. A defendant is excused when he is not blameworthy or respon-
sible for his conduct, even though it apparently violates a criminal
law.2
4
Much confusion surrounding the definitions ofjustification and
excuse would be dispelled by attending to the distinction between
judgments about acts and judgments about actors. In practice, of
course, it is frequently difficult to specify what a judgment is about;
more will be said about this problem in Part III. But confusion
about the objects of judgment should not infect the definitions of
these concepts. By definition, if the facts that comprise the defense
tions should be presupposed. Ultimately, the adequacy of a definition must be assessed
in the context of the theory of which it is a part.
22 There has been a tendency to conflate the definitions of justification and excuse
with the various uses to which this distinction might be put. Greenawalt discussed
"three possible bases for drawing the distinction: (1) a distinction between warranted
and wrongful conduct; (2) a division between general and individual claims; and (3) a
distinction based on the rights of others." Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, supra note 3, at
1898. In a later article, Greenawalt recognized (1) as "the central distinction between
justification and excuse." Greenawalt, Justifications and Excuses, supra note 3, at 91. But
see infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text for some difficulties with Greenawalt's un-
derstanding of justifications.
Fletcher writes:
The distinguishing features of excuses are: (1) they do not negate the wrongfulness
of the actor's conduct, (2) they are personal to the accused, and (3) they do not
presuppose that the actor defend either the legal order ... or that he defend the
greater good .... Claims ofjustification are distinguishable on all three counts: (1)
they do negate the criminal or wrongful nature of the actor's conduct, (2) they are
universally available to anyone who wishes to intervene in the situation precisely
because (3) they presuppose that the justified actor is acting on behalf of the objec-
tive legal order or the objectively greater good.
Fletcher, Rights and Excuses, 3 CRIM.JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1984, at 17, 17. It is not
entirely clear which of these claims should be construed as conceptual and which as
substantive.
23 See Eser, Justification and Excuse, 24 AM. J. COMP. L. 621 (1976).
24 Many theorists would add the words "without justification" to the end of this defi-
nition of excuses. It is unclear whether justification and excuse are serially ordered, so
that the offering of an excuse concedes the unavailability of a justification. See D.
HuSAK, supra note 7, at 194-96.
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describe the defendant's act, they constitute a justification; if these
facts describe the defendant himself, they constitute an excuse.
With these definitions in mind, it is instructive to examine the
latest of Kent Greenawalt's thoughts on this topic. In the opening
paragraph of the most recent of his two contributions, Greenawalt
blurs the distinction between judgments about acts and judgments
about actors. In the sentences in which the concepts ofjustification
and excuse are initially presented, Greenawalt writes, "If [the de-
fendant] is fully justified, she will not be subject to blame or to clas-
sification as a weak or defective person. If [the defendant] is
excused, she may be regarded as wholly or partly free of blame, but
she will have demonstrated weakness or some defect."' 25 These re-
marks represent a peculiar introduction to the concepts ofjustifica-
tion and excuse. Consider the first sentence. It is misguided to
suggest that the presence (or absence) of a justification has any im-
plications about whether the agent is weak or defective.2 6 Justifica-
tions focus entirely on actions, not agents. Next consider the
second sentence. A person who is excused is not to blame for her
conduct, but it need not be true that she has "demonstrated weak-
ness or some defect." Perhaps all excuses presuppose some kind of
disability,27 but this substantive conclusion cannot be established by
definition.
28
Problems in defining justifications and excuses, although formi-
dable, pale in comparison with the even larger difficulty in resolving
the second question: when and under what conditions are defend-
ants justified or excused? No definition can resolve this issue; what
25 Greenawalt,Justifications and Excuses, supra note 3, at 89. This confusion resurfaces
elsewhere in the article. Greenawalt writes: "if one is concerned with judging the actor,
the actor's blameless perception of the facts ought to be sufficient to support ajustifica-
tion." Id. at 102. But why considerjustifications at all if "one is concerned with judging
the actor"?
26 Perhaps Greenawalt believes that judgments about acts (always? typically? in the
absence of an excuse?) entail judgments about actors. This belief is part of a theory
about the connection between agent morality and action morality that may or may not
be correct. Presumably "weak or defective persons" can perform justified acts, and per-
sons who are not "weak or defective" can perform unjustified acts. In any event, these
claims surely have no place in a definition of justifications.
27 See 1 P. ROBINSON, supra note 2, at 92 (defense of the view that excuses presuppose
a disability). Even Robinson, however, retracts this view in his discussion of mistakes. 2
P. ROBINSON, supra note 2, at 375.
28 Finally, even if Greenawalt is correct that an excuse absolves an agent from blame
but presupposes a weakness or defect, it need -not be true that the agent is free from
blame for the weakness or defect. Insanity, for example, may constitute an excuse
whether or not the agent is blameworthy for having brought about his own insanity. For
a sophisticated treatment of these issues, see Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own
Defense: A Study of the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L. REv. 1 (1985).
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is required is a theory - or, rather, two theories. 29 The first theory
specifies when conduct is not wrongful, and the second theory speci-
fies when persons are not blameworthy for their conduct.
Many theorists have defended theories of excuses, although no
one theory has attracted an overwhelming consensus. 30 Commenta-
tors have appreciated the need for a theory of excuses and have ex-
pended a great deal of effort in this direction. By contrast, it is
disappointing and remarkable that few theories ofjustifications have
been proposed. 31 Most significantly, some theorists have failed to
appreciate the need for a theory by conflating the problem of defin-
ing justifications with the separate task of defending a theory to
identify when conduct is justified.32
The writings of Paul Robinson are noteworthy in this regard.
Since Robinson has provided the most detailed and sophisticated
account of defenses in Anglo-American criminal theory, it is impor-
tant to examine his position on justifications. "The conduct of a
justified actor," writes Robinson in the section that introduces the
concept of justification, "is not culpable because its benefits out-
weigh the harm or evil of the offense itself."33 When justifying cir-
29 It is highly unlikely that a single theory can suffice to establish the conditions
under which conduct is not wrongful, as well as the conditions under which agents are
not blameworthy for their conduct. The former question raises problems in what is
called action morality, the latter in agent morality. The relationship between these two theo-
ries with different objects ofjudgment continues to confound philosophers. See S. HUD-
SON, HUMAN CHARACTER AND MORALrrY (1986).
30 Four candidates are worthy of mention. The first is utilitarian. An excuse should
be recognized whenever so doing would produce a result such as happiness that the
utilitarians identify as good. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORAL AND LEGISLATION (0. Piest ed. 1948) (1823).
The second claims that the various excusing conditions are symptoms of some disa-
bility, usually described as the inability to control one's conduct, or involuntariness.
This view, associated with Aristotle, is defended in 2 P. ROBINSON, supra note 2, at 223
n. 1: "For the purposes of the criminal law, the [disability that causes an excusing condi-
tion] must be such that the act constituting the offense is not the product of a meaning-
ful choice."
The third locates excuses by reference to character. This view, with a legacy tracea-
ble to Hume, is described in Bayles, Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility, 1 LAw &
PHIL. 5, 7 (1982): "Acts may or may not indicate character traits. If an act does indicate
an undesirable character trait, then blame is appropriate; if it does not, then blame is
inappropriate."
The fourth identifies excuses with circumstances that distort the agent's practical
reasoning. Internal distortions, such as the effects of alcohol, or external distortions,
such as duress, can render decision-making irrational. For a critical discussion of this
view, see Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1091 (1985).
31 See the discussion of the "four theories of justification" that allegedly "deserve
attention" in Dressier, supra note 1, at 1164-65.
32 See infra text accompanying notes 33-36.
33 1 P. ROBINSON, supra note 2, at 70.
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cumstances obtain, "the harm sought to be prevented or punished
by an offense ... is outweighed by the need to avoid an even greater
harm or to further a greater societal interest."3 4 The paradigm ex-
ample Robinson uses to illustrate the category of justification is a
case of "necessity": a defendant burns a field of corn between a
raging forest fire and a densely populated town inl order to create a
firebreak and save the town from destruction.3 5
Robinson's account appears to conflate the definition of ajusti-
fication with a substantive theory of when conduct is justified. This
confusion should be evident if one inquires why anyone would be
inclined to describe conduct that creates a net benefit as justified.
Presumably Robinson believes it is appropriate to deem such con-
duct as justified because he believes it is not wrongful. If he thought
that any instances of conduct that created a net benefit were wrong-
ful, it is hard to imagine that he would countenance them as
justified.
The failure to distinguish definitional from substantive ques-
tions gives rise to a number of related difficulties. Most importantly,
Robinson would find unintelligible the propositions that (a) conduct
may be justified although it creates a net balance of social harm, and
(b) conduct may be unjustified although it creates a net balance of
social benefit. A defense of (a) will be sketched in Part III. But
whether or not these claims are true, they are clearly coherent. Be-
cause his account of justifications does not sort conceptual from
substantive issues, Robinson must regard these claims as contradic-
tory.36 According to Robinson, if conduct did not produce a greater
good, it simply could not qualify as a justification.
Since conduct is justified when it is not wrongful, the key to
presenting a defensible account ofjustifications is to attend to how
the concept of the "not wrongful" should be understood. A
number of theorists have observed that the concept of the "justi-
fied" or "not wrongful" is ambiguous between conduct that is
"merely permissible" and conduct that is "commendable." 3 7 There
is a great deal of difference between conduct that a system of norms
should tolerate and not punish or condemn, as opposed to conduct
34 Id. at 83.
35 Id.
36 It is noteworthy that Robinson does not conflate the concept of an excuse with a
substantive theory about when persons are excused. He writes that an actor is excused
when "he is not responsible for his deed," I P. ROBINSON, supra note 2, at 91, and he is
not responsible for his deed when a disability deprives him of "meaningful choice," 2 P.
ROBINSON, supra note 2, at 223 n.I.
37 See Dressler, supra note 3, at 69-77. Any number of additional ambiguities are
unimportant for present purposes.
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that is worthy of praise and emulation. Our moral vocabulary is suf-
ficiently rich to capture this difference in the variety of circum-
stances in which it has significance.
Which of these two senses of justifications is pertinent to the
criminal law? It is crucial to appreciate the reasons for adopting the
former interpretation; justifications should be understood as con-
duct that is permissible, although not necessarily commendable or
praiseworthy. Justifications, after all, are important to the criminal
law because they are a type of defense. Defenses, according to
Robinson, are "any set of identifiable conditions or circumstances
that may prevent conviction for an offense."38 Undoubtedly, the
judgment that conduct is permissible is sufficient to "prevent con-
viction"; it need not also be praiseworthy.
Conduct is legally permissible, according to Hohfeldian analy-
sis, when a defendant has no legal duty not to perform it-when no
law prohibits it. 39 By definition, no instance of permissible conduct
should be subject to punishment.40 If some permissible actions
were not justified, it would be necessary to invent a new category of
criminal law defense to represent the concept of "permissible but
unjustified,"'4 1 since a defendant whose conduct is permissible vio-
lates no legal duty and is entitled to an acquittal. Hence it is fair to
conclude that all permissible actions are justified in the sense rele-
vant to the criminal law. The converse is true as well-all justified
acts are permissible. It is difficult to imagine how conduct could be
commendable and praiseworthy unless it were at least permissible.
42
38 1 P. ROBINSON, supra note 2, at 70. Surely this definition is too broad, since it
seemingly includes as criminal law defenses situations in which a defendant avoids ap-
prehension or bribes a judge. Perhaps such consequences led Robinson to qualify his
definition by remarking that he is referring to the "casual sense" of the term "defense."
Id.
39 Hohfeld uses the term "privilege" to describe the permissible. W. HOHFELD, FUN-
DAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 38-39 (W. Cook ed. 1978). Once again, clarity about
Hohfeldian analysis requires a decision about whether justifications should be construed
as exceptions to prohibitory norms, or as licenses to infringe such norms. See supra note
7.
40 "[A] justification need do no more than demonstrate that the reason for the crimi-
nal justice system's intervention-harm-is absent. It is not necessary that the conduct
be affirmatively desirable or morally good. It is enough that it is not undesirable or not
morally bad." Dressler, supra note 3, at 83.
41 Greenawalt recognizes the explanatory power of a concept of "partial justifica-
tion," according to which an action "is less inappropriate than it would otherwise be," but
he notes that "the term justification has an either-or quality that makes people hesitant
to speak of a partial justification." Greenawalt, Justifications and Excuses, supra note 3, at
92. Had Greenawalt explicated the justifiable in terms of the permissible, there would
be little need to introduce a concept of partial justification. No action is more or less
permissible than another, although it may be more or less commendable than another.
42 But see Buckoke v. Greater London Council, 2 All E.R. 254, 258 (1971) (Lord Den-
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Thus the biconditional is true that acts are justified if and only if
they are permissible.
This conclusion may seem apparent. Nevertheless, some theo-
rists have not considered it while others have gone to extraordinary
lengths to resist it. Robinson does not so much as entertain the pos-
sibility that justified action might not be commendable. 43 George
Fletcher considers but rejects the possibility that all permissible
conduct is justified.44 He provides two arguments for concluding
that justified conduct is "right and proper," and thus should be un-
derstood as praiseworthy, and not merely as permissible. His first
reason is etymological. "Justification," he reminds us, "derives
from the wordjus which means Right. Justifications render conduct
right; and if it is objectively right, individuals surely have a personal
right to engage in the conduct in question."
45
There are several problems with this initial argument. First, it
is doubtful that much significance should be attached to ordinary
language or etymological arguments. The concepts employed here
are sufficiently technical to warrant skepticism that their meanings
should be governed by their original or ordinary uses. Fletcher is
appropriately critical of such arguments elsewhere,46 but these same
reservations are not expressed in this context. Second, if this ety-
mological argument is accepted, the word "justification" must be
abandoned as poorly chosen to represent this category of criminal
law defense. What is required is a concept that means "conduct that
apparently violates a criminal law but is not legally wrongful." If the
word "justification" lacks this meaning, it should be replaced with a
more suitable candidate. Third, even if "justification" is synony-
mous with "right," the latter concept itself is notoriously ambiguous
and hardly resolves the debate. Hohfeld distinguished at least four
senses of legal rights,47 and theorists have had no difficulty uncover-
ning, MR)(driver of fire engine should be congratulated for running a red light in cer-
tain circumstances, although the law compels every driver to stop at red lights regardless
of emergency).
43 This failure results from Robinson's commitment to a utilitarian account ofjustifi-
cations. See infra Part III.
44 See the references in Dressier, supra note 3, at 69-77 nn.38-99. But see the possi-
ble concession in Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, supra note 4, at 954 ("Claims of
justification concern the rightness, or at least the legal permissibility, of an act ....").
45 Fletcher, Should Intolerable Prison Conditions Generate aJustification or an Excuse for Es-
cape?, 26 UCLA L. REv. 1355, 1358 (1979).
46 For Fletcher's response to Lord Cross, see G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 701-02.
47 Hohfeld identified four kinds of legal rights: privileges, claim-rights, powers, and




ing additional ambiguities. 48 A perfectly respectable kind of right is
a Hohfeldian privilege or liberty,49 which is the category of the per-
missible as used here.
Fourth, the conclusion that persons have a right to engage in
whatever conduct is right is either tautological or false. At the very
least, its truth depends upon a theory of rights that is probably de-
fective. Perhaps the leading theory about the nature and function of
rights is that they insulate right-holders from interference that
would otherwise be legitimate on utilitarian grounds.50 According
to this theory, the state may prevent citizens from doing what would
otherwise be permissible if such prevention serves utilitarian objec-
tives. 5' But the pursuit of utilitarian gains does not warrant the
state in preventing citizens from doing what they have a right to do.
If this theory is acceptable, it is false that persons have a right to
engage in any instance of right conduct. 52 Finally, even if persons
have a right to engage in a given course of conduct, it does not fol-
low that their conduct is beyond criticism, praiseworthy, or worthy
of emulation and support by others. Some rights may be wrong to
exercise.
53
Fletcher's more significant argument for believing that some
permissible actions are not justified derives from his views about the
nature and function of the "ideal of law," which he identifies as "to
suppress violence and to channel disputes into orderly processes."
54
He continues, "[i]f the law were content to label [justified] conduct
... as permissible, it would in effect encourage rather than suppress
violence." 55 This is because "if our legal ideal is the suppression of
violence, then we must employ a set of ideas that enables us to de-
48 See, e.g., Montague, Two Concepts of Rights, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 372 (1980).
49 See Williams' "correction" of Hohfeldian terminology. Williams, The Concept of
Legal Liberty, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 1129 (1956).
50 See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RiGhTs SERIOUSLY 82-94 (1977).
51 Thus, for example, the state is permitted to interfere in a person's liberty to drive
in either direction on Lexington Avenue, if making the road one-way promotes the
utilirian goal of facilitating the flow of traffic. The state would not be permitted to con-
vert Lexington Avenue into a one-way street if persons possessed an antecedent right to
travel in either direction. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 50, at 269.
52 Of course, Fletcher might simply mean that right conduct is conduct that persons
have a right to perform, but then his position is a tautology rather than a substantive
insight.
53 A familiar example is the proposal of Nazis to march in Skokie. It is consistent to
believe that persons have the right to affiliate with the Nazi party, and that Nazis have
the right to assemble, but that such conduct is wrong and is not worthy of support or
emulation. See Waldron, A Right to Do Wrong, 92 ETHics 21 (1981).




termine upon whose side we should intervene." 56 As long as we
subscribe to Fletcher's hypothesis that the possessor of a justifica-
tion has a right to act, the implications for intervention by accesso-
ries are clear: they may intervene only on behalf of the party who is
in the right. But if we abandon Fletcher's hypothesis, the law may
be forced to stand idly by, powerless to prevent combat between
private citizens. Thus to reject Fletcher's argument is to encourage
anarchy.
Of course, this argument is question-begging if our project is to
provide an unbiased assessment of the issue of whether the distinc-
tion between justification and excuse is useful in illuminating the
problem of accessorial liability. Fletcher's claim is that his account
of justifications is preferable precisely because it has this use. This
argument can hardly provide an independent ground for believing
that the distinction can be applied for this purpose. Such reasoning
is circular.
More importantly, there is some question about whether
Fletcher's remarks accurately express the "ideal of law." In any
number of circumstances, it is unclear on which side of a contro-
versy, if any, persons may intervene. There is no reason to believe
that the existence of these circumstances represents an erosion or
breakdown of the ideal of law.5 7 Instead, it may represent a rea-
soned judgment that law is not ubiquitous or pervasive and that
some kinds of disputes are private and should be resolved solely by
the parties. In fact, the Anglo-American legal tradition is hostile to
the suggestion that the law should prefer one side to another in
each and every disagreement. Presumably, many domestic disputes
provide examples.
58
Fletcher might respond by pointing out that such situations do
not require a theory ofjustification, which becomes necessary only
56 Id. at 1360. See the claim that the government should not abandon its "monopoly
on force." Hassemer, supra note 1, at 603.
57 As Fletcher states:
According to the ideal of the criminal law as a self-regulating set of conduct rules,
the rules must generate a solution ex ante for every case. The 'permissible' flows
from a skepticism about the possibility of a single solution .... The notion of the
permissible thus has no place in this idealized system of self-regulation.
Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, supra note 4, at 977.
This quotation indicates that Fletcher should be understood to assert the "strong
incompatibility thesis" that in every conflict one of two parties will be justified, and not
merely the "weak incompatibility thesis" that if one party is justified in doing X, the
other cannot be justified in stopping that person from doing X. For a different interpre-
tation of Fletcher's position, see Byrd, Wrongdoing and Attribution: Implications Beyond the
Justification-Exctse Distinction, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1289, 1333 (1987).
58 Of course, the law should neither be neutral about all domestic disputes nor about
the measures that can be used by private parties in settling them.
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when conduct apparently violates a criminal law. Even in these cir-
cumstances, however, it is no defect of a theory that it sometimes
fails to identify the party on whose behalf intervention is warranted.
If two persons on the Titanic engage in a struggle upon simultane-
ously reaching a lifeboat with a single space available, it may be in-
appropriate for bystanders to assist either.59 But-and this is the
important point-it does not follow that either party must lack ajus-
tification for the offense of assault. The fact that bystanders have no
better reason to intervene on one side or the other of a conflict does
not entail that the actions of one or both parties in the conflict can-
not be justified. Both are justified in the sense that both are acting
permissibly. 6
0
This section has clarified the concept of justification and pro-
vided reasons to believe that this criminal law defense category is
better identified with the permissible than with the commendable.
It remains to be seen how these observations bear on the content of
a substantive theory of justifications and ultimately on the issue of
the criminal liability of accessories.
III. THE SUBSTANCE OF JUSTIFICATIONS
Under what conditions is it not wrongful to apparently violate a
criminal law? More generally, under what conditions is conduct
permissible? It seems hopeless to answer the former question with-
out committing oneself to a position on the latter. If so, it should be
clear that a reply requires nothing less than a comprehensive moral
theory.6' Thus it is not surprising that no solution can be defended
with much confidence. Different moral theories lead some commen-
tators to categorize conduct as justified that others categorize as ex-
cused, and that still others denounce altogether.62
Fortunately, for present purposes, it is less difficult to identify
59 Fletcher might agree, and might respond that this example does not describe
what he calls "incompatible actions." Fletcher writes: "Acts are incompatible if they
cannot be performed simultaneously." Fletcher, supra note 45, at 1358. Presumably,
acts become incompatible only if one act in the pair is defined by use of a "success
verb." D's act of rape is not incompatible with V's attempt to resist rape, but is incompat-
ible with V's successfully resisting that rape. Still, the restriction of the domain of
Fletcher's thesis to the universe of pairs of actions in which one or more is described by
a success verb seems ad hoc and arbitrary. The fact remains that the ideal of law does not
suffer from the existence of circumstances in which it fails to identify a unique combat-
ant on whose behalf third party intervention is appropriate.
60 In Fletcher's sense ofjustification, in which the justified party acts commendably,
his "incompatibility thesis" is more plausible. See supra note 57.
61 Morawetz appreciates the extent to which law and morality intersect in criminal
law defenses. See Morawetz, supra note 3, at 278.
62 Greenawalt is persuasive in illustrating this point by reference to different atti-
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defective theories than to defend an adequate alternative. Little can
be said to recommend Robinson's approach; his account is dearly
wrong, even if the correct theory remains elusive.63 His supposition
that conduct is justified when it promotes a net social benefit is utili-
tarian. Robinson's unabashed reliance on utilitarianism as an ac-
ceptable account of justifications is remarkable in light of the fact
that utilitarianism has been thoroughly discredited in most philo-
sophical circles. 64 It should not be necessary to rehearse the stan-
dard and familiar difficulties with utilitarianism. In any event,
Robinson appears to be sensitive to these difficulties elsewhere in
his writings. He does not presuppose a utilitarian theory of excuses,
although the application of utilitarianism to the question of whether
conduct is justified is no more plausible than its application to the
question of whether agents are blameworthy for their conduct.65
It might be hoped, however, that a comprehensive theory of
morality is not required after all. A theorist might concede difficul-
ties with utilitarianism generally but insist that it nonetheless repre-
sents an adequate theory of justifications as a criminal law defense.
A person requires a justification only when he has apparently vio-
lated a criminal law. Perhaps utilitarianism offers a satisfactory an-
swer to the question of when the apparent violation of a criminal law
is permissible, although it is defective as a theory of permissible
conduct in general. This position is coherent, but implausible. Jus-
tifications such as self-defense do not seem to depend on the belief
that the repelling of unlawful aggressors promotes more utility than
disutility. Surely persons have a right to protect themselves from un-
lawful aggression, even when their actions fail to produce preferable
consequences. 66 The onus is on Robinson to explain why, if utilita-
rianism is a radically defective theory of action morality in other
contexts, it is adequate as an account of when the apparent commis-
sion of a criminal offense is permissible. Robinson does not address
this issue. But this position is worthwhile to explore despite its ini-
tudes about the desirability of retreat in cases of self-defense. See Greenawalt, Perplexing
Borders, supra note 3, at 1905-06.
63 Perhaps no single, unifying principle accounts for each of the justifications the
criminal law should recognize; but matters become murky if no coherent alternative ex-
ists at all. See the challenge posed by Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive
Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591 (1981).
64 Perhaps the most persuasive critic of utilitarianism is Bernard Williams. He writes
that "the simple-mindedness of utilitarianism disqualifies it totally," and concludes that
"[t]he day cannot be too far off in which we hear no more of it." J. SMART & B. WIL-
LIAMs, UTILaTARIANISM, FOR AND AGAINST 150 (1973).
65 For an attack on a utilitarian theory of excuses, see H.L.A. HART, Legal Responsibility
and Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILrY 28 (1968).
66 See Morawetz, supra note 3, at 290.
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tial implausibility; interesting conclusions for the problem of acces-
sorial liability emerge if exactly why utilitarianism does not provide
an adequate theory of justifications becomes clear.
Perhaps Robinson reasons as follows. Apparently, committing
a criminal offense is presumptively wrongful; it brings about
whatever harm the criminalization of that conduct is designed to
prevent. Bringing about a harm can be permissible only insofar as it
prevents the occurrence of an even greater harm. Thus, he is led to
defend the utilitarian view of justifications presupposed by the
Model Penal Code: conduct is justified when "the harm or evil
sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to
be prevented by the law defining the offense charged."
'67
This reasoning is seductive. There is a trivial sense in which a
presumptively wrongful act can be permissible only if that presump-
tion is defeated or overcome in the particular case by a more
weighty consideration. But it should not be assumed that the
greater good that provides the justification must be understood in
terms of consequences. The supposition that only preferrable conse-
quences can justify presumptively wrongful conduct begs the ques-
tion against deontological theories 68 that do not assess rightness by
reference to superior results.69 According to deontological theo-
ries, rightness is a function of conformity with acceptable principles,
not of the production of optimal consequences.
Greenawalt provides several examples designed to expose the
weaknesses of a utilitarian theory of justifications. He concentrates
primarily on a select class of cases involving mistakes: "situations in
which from the standpoint of all existing human knowledge an ac-
tion appears to be desirable, but unforeseeable consequences make
it turn out to be undesirable.- 70 Suppose that a medieval doctor,
acting on the best medical information available at the time, fails to
administer what contemporary science recognizes as a cure. How
should we characterize what modem medicine would condemn as
malpractice? Several (somewhat complicated) possible descriptions
67 Model Penal Code § 3.02(1)(a) (1985). See the discussion in Lenckner, The Princi-
pe of Interest Balancing as a General Basis ofJustification, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 645.
68 Perhaps question-begging would be tolerable were it not for the fact that the great
majority of contemporary moral philosophers subscribe to some version of a deontolog-
ical theory.
69 See G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 769-70 ("[T]he theory of interest-balancing fails
to take into account important values that shape the theory of justification. Of these
additional values, we should take special note of the concept of autonomy .... Once
accepted, the value of autonomy does not lend itself to being offset by competing social
interests.").
70 Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, supra note 3, at 1908.
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suggest themselves, but only two will be considered here.71 The
moral philosophers of today, retrospectively evaluating such con-
duct, might pronounce it as unjustified but excused. A second pos-
sibility is to deem the conduct justified, notwithstanding its bad
consequences.
Robinson, applying his utilitarian perspective, is committed to
the first alternative. He embraces what might be called the mistake
thesis: a mistake about a justification, however reasonable, can only
give rise to an excuse, but never to ajustification. He reasons, "[h]is
conduct has not, in fact, avoided a greater harm or furthered a
greater good; it has not caused a net benefit, but rather a net
harm." 72 Fletcher concurs, although his thinking is less utilitarian.
73
Greenawalt, on the other hand, rejects the mistake thesis, and re-
gards the second alternative as obvious: "that the law should treat
[the] defense as one ofjustification seems plain."' 74 The truth of the
mistake thesis is crucial in assessing utilitarianism as a viable theory
ofjustifications as a criminal law defense. If it is incorrect, conduct
may be justified notwithstanding its bad consequences. Should the
mistake thesis be accepted?
Perhaps no single argument can resolve this dispute, and for
good reason. It is notoriously difficult to decide what features
should be incorporated into descriptions of the defendant's act.
There is no consensus in philosophy or in law about the extent to
which consequences of acts should be included in their descrip-
tions.75 Notice the ambiguity in Greenawalt's reason for rejecting
the mistake thesis, and embracing the view that some mistakes about
justifications may give rise to a justification. He contends that "[i]f
one wants to make a moral evaluation of [the actor's] behavior or to
recommend behavior for others faced with similar ascertainable
facts, the word 'justification' is much more suitable*than the word
'excuse.' "76
The difficulty in this argument is transparent, for everything de-
71 Such cases might lead one to abandon the justification/excuse dichotomy as over-
simplified and unworkable, see id.; or be thought to necessitate the creation of a new
defense type such as 'justified wrongs," see Morawetz, supra note 3; or be said not to
involve mistakes at all, but the defense of lege artis, see Hassemer, supra note 1, at 599.
72 1 P. ROBINSON, supra note 2, at 114-15.
73 See G. FLECHER, supra note 2, at 696; Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, supra
note 4, at 972-73.
74 Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, supra note 3, at 1908-09.
75 Legal theorists have long debated whether consequences should be included
within the actus reus of an offense. Salmond, for example, defined acts to include their
accompanying circumstances and consequences. See J. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 401
(1Ith ed. 1957).
76 Greenawalt, Justifications and Excuses, supra note 3, at 94.
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pends on how "the actor's behavior" is described. 77 If his act is
characterized as "failing to save his patient, even when a cure is
readily available," it is clear that the doctor's conduct would not be
proscribed. -But if his act is characterized as "applying the best med-
ical treatment available at the time," his conduct is commendable.
Both descriptions are true; which should be preferred? This ques-
tion illustrates the extent to which the research project of applying
the distinction between justification and excuse cannot be imple-
mented without first presupposing some controversial views about
the philosophy of action.78
But an (inconclusive) reason may be provided for rejecting the
mistake thesis, even without sinking into the quagmire of action the-
ory. Justifications are a part of action morality. 79 Arguably, a condi-
tion of adequacy for a theory of action morality is that it be capable
of guiding conduct.80 If so, there is good reason to reject a theory
ofjustifications that withholds judgment until the effects of conduct,
unforeseeable at the moment of decision, become known. 'A theory
should not require omniscience before it offers useful advice. This
approach could not guide conduct effectively; the principle, "do
whatever will produce the best consequences, even though there is
no way to identify them at the time of choice," cannot be translated
into meaningful behavior. Such advice cannot be followed, and it is
odd to include within a viable theory of action morality a principle
to which persons are incapable of adhering.
8 '
On the other hand, the advice "act according to the best infor-
mation available at the time,"8 2 is capable of guiding conduct ex ante,
which is the only time that guidance is required. According to this
approach, conduct that conforms to the best practical advice that
can be given is beyond moral reproach and must be held to bejusti-
77 Notice also the ambiguity in what the actor "has done." Id. at 95.
78 Greenawalt claims to derive support for his thesis by noting that "the central char-
acteristic of justified action is that it is warranted." Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, supra
note 3, at 1903. He then compares the meaning of a warranted action in ethics with a
warranted belief in epistemology, concluding that "to be justified is to have sound, good
reasons for what one does or believes." Id. Horowitz counters that "[a] good way to
begin the discussion of exculpation.., is to ban words like warranted." Horowitz,Justifi-
cation and Excuse in the Program of the Criminal Law, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer
1986, at 109, 110.
79 "Action morality" is that part of moral theory that evaluates actions, as distinct
from other objects of evaluation, e.g. agents, states of affairs, or character traits.
80 See R. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF MORALS 1 (1952).
81 This point may underlie the good sense in the Kantian slogan, "ought implies
can."
82 This (admittedly crude) formulation of a rule to guide conduct is somewhat more




fled, even if its actual consequences diverge from what is intended.
If one is willing to stipulate that the principles of action morality
must be capable of guiding conduct, there is less reason to embrace
the mistake thesis, and hold that mistakes about a justification can
only be excused, but never justified.
Thus far there is no conclusive reason either to accept or to
reject Greenawalt's proposal that cases involving mistakes expose
the deficiencies of a utilitarian theory of justifications. Can further
light on this dispute be shed by additional requirements that an ade-
quate theory of justifications must satisfy? Fletcher and Robinson
continually emphasize that justifications render conduct "objectively
right," although the meaning of this adverb is notoriously elusive.83
Somehow, they construe the objectivity requirement as support for
the mistake thesis.
What is objectivity, and exactly how is the requirement of objec-
tivity alleged to support the mistake thesis to show that mistakes
about justifications can never be justified? At least two interpreta-
tions of objectivity are available. First, in order to qualify as a de-
fense recognized in criminal law, conduct must actually be
permissible, as opposed to merely believed to be permissible, by the
agent.8 4 Thus a defendant may believe it to be commendable to dis-
criminate against minorities he holds to be inferior, but his belief,
however sincere, does not entitle him to behave accordingly.8 5 If
beliefs do not suffice to render conduct justified, what does? Again,
the answer to this question is dependent on the correct theory of
justifications: conduct is justified-objectively-when the correct
theory says it is.
Second, any criminal law defense must be "objective" in the
sense that it be available to any person in similar circumstances.
This seemingly innocuous "universalizability" requirement is in fact
complicated and tricky.8 6 Many theorists have employed it as a basis
for believing that the moral theory embodied by the criminal law
83 The concept of objectivity has bedeviled moral and legal theorists for centuries.
For the most well-known recent philosophical work on the concept, see T. NAGEL, THE
VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1985).
84 'Justification-harmony with the Right-is an objective phenomenon. Mere belief
cannot generate a justification, however reasonable the belief might be." Fletcher, The
Right and the Reasonable, supra note 4, at 972.
85 The view that morality is solely a function of intentions is extraordinarily common
among legal theorists, although few, if any, moral philosophers have held this position.
See D. HusAK, supra note 7, at 128-32. See also Fletcher's response to Fried. Fletcher,
supra note 45, at 1362.
86 See R. HARE, supra note 80; R. HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON (1963) (a defense and
explication of the universalizability requirement in ethics).
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must be impartial.8 7 Most theorists agree that impartiality is a condi-
tion of adequacy of any moral or legal theory; disagreement begins
in attempting to identify what impartiality entails.8 8 Some commen-
tators apparently construe the requirement of impartiality to de-
mand that persons exhibit no favoritism toward themselves or their
friends and relatives.8 9 A person who allowed his own interests to
count more heavily than those of others would be guilty of partiality,
and thus of violating the objectivity requirement.
But does objectivity really entail impartiality as so understood?
Richard Wasserstrom has -noted that many of the problems in pro-
fessional ethics are generated because the behavior of lawyers is role-
differentiated: "[i]t is the nature of role-differentiated behavior that it
often makes it both appropriate and desirable for the person in a
particular role to put to one side considerations of various sorts-
and especially various moral considerations-that would otherwise
be relevant if not decisive." 90 Wasserstrom was especially inter-
ested to explore the extent to which the role of professional in gen-
eral, or lawyer in particular, could serve to justify conduct that
would otherwise be wrong. 91 What is less frequently noticed is that
conduct is often role-differentiated in nonprofessional contexts as
well. Consider the role of friend, in which a person shows favorit-
ism toward a select group of his acquaintances. Such behavior may
conform to the universalizability requirement, as long as he is will-
ing to allow others to demonstrate comparable favoritism toward
their friends. Would a moral theory that allowed such preference fail
the objectivity requirement, according to which objectivity entails
impartiality?
Our pre-theoretical intuitions are likely to be ambivalent about
such questions. We all exhibit extraordinary favoritism toward our
friends and relatives, and typically construe these reactions as ex-
pressions of loyalty. A person who showed no partiality toward his
friends would probably have none. It is unlikely that these attitudes
can be dismissed as evidence of a moral deficiency, for our ideals do
not recommend that we demonstrate to total strangers the same
care and consideration we show to our friends and relatives. But the
favoritism we exhibit toward persons who are close to us pales by
87 The constraint which universalizability imposes on partiality is explicated in R.
HARE, FREEDOM AND REASON, supra note 86.
88 See id.
89 See id.
90 Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, in ETHIcs AND THE LEGAL




comparison with the favoritism we show ourselves. There is no
good reason why the role of se/f should not be understood as role-
differentiated as well. To care more about our interests because they
are ours may be distinctive of what it means to have a personal point
of view.92 Again, it would be preposterous to suppose that such fa-
voritism is the product of a moral shortcoming. As long as special
attention to oneself is not excessive,93 it is not vulnerable to moral
criticism. We fully expect such behavior, and would probably fail to
comprehend a person who did not exhibit it.
Appreciating that behavior towards one's friends or relatives is
role-differentiated is crucial in assessing situations in which a person
apparently commits a criminal offense. 94 Suppose a mother diverts
a runaway tram from one track to another to save her infant daugh-
ter at the cost of an innocent life.95 Or alter the hypothetical so that
she sacrifices two innocent lives to save her daughter. Is either ac-
tion justifiable? A negative answer might be given if "justifiable"
were taken to mean "commendable." But as long as "justifiable" is
construed to mean "tolerable" or "permissible," it is more likely
that her conduct is justified.96 Some sacrifices are so great that per-
92 See S. SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM 56-57 (1982).
93 Those philosophers who recognize the permissibility of favoritism continue to de-
bate its limits. See Scheffier's cryptic comment that his theory
would allow each agent to assign a certain proportionately greater weight to his own
interests than to the interests of other people. It would then allow the agent to
promote the non-optimal outcome of his choosing, provided only that the degree of
its inferiority to each of the superior outcomes he could instead promote in no case
exceeded, by more than the specified proportion, the degree of sacrifice necessary
for him to promote the superior outcome.
id. at 20.
One limitation on the permissibility of favoritism toward one's friends or relatives
arises in cases in which the former occupies a position of authority in exercising or inter-
preting rules in a dispute in which the latter is a party. Clearly a judge may not exhibit
favoritism toward a litigant who happens to be a friend or relative.
94 The criminal law frequently takes account of the fact that partiality is expected
between persons. The law of criminal omissions, for example, recognizes that persons
have affirmative duties to assist those with whom they stand in "special relationships."
A mother would be criminally liable for a failure to care for her own infant, when no
comparable duty requires her to care for others. Perhaps the most well-known illustra-
tive case is State v.Jones, 308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (jury could not find defendant
guilty of involuntary manslaughter for giving child improper care until they found de-
fendant was under legal duty to care for child).
95 Some interesting hypotheticals involving these kinds of situations are discussed by
Thomson. J. THOMSON, Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem, in RIGrrs,,RESrr-
TION, AND RISE 78 (1986); J. THOMSON, The Trolley Problem, in RIGHTS, REsTIrrTION, AND
RISK 94 (1986).
96 Even Fletcher's thesis that third parties cannot be justified in assisting excused
conduct is qualified by the exception "unless perhaps they were close relatives." See G.
FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 857. But Fletcher does not explore the rationale for this
possible counter-example to his thesis.
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sons should never be required to make them, except perhaps in ex-
traordinary circumstances such as wartime.97 Instead of rejecting
such partiality categorically, moral and legal theory should struggle
with the extremely difficult question of delineating its acceptable
boundaries. 98
The important point is that a justification of such conduct
should not be precluded by misinterpreting the "objectivity" or
"impartiality" requirements. It would be a mistake to suppose that
recognizing a justification for the mother in the above examples
would commit the law to the absurdity that one life is "objectively"
more valuable than another. One life would be objectively more
valuable than another only if anyone were permitted to save it by di-
verting the tram. But not just anyone should be allowed to divert the
tram; only someone who stands in a "special relation" to the infant
may do so. A theory ofjustifications must only be willing to permit
all persons who stand in "special (i.e., role-differentiated) relations"
to potential victims to behave comparably.
The Model Penal Code does not recognize a defense for the
mother in either of the above hypotheticals. Two possible defenses
are unavailable. Her conduct is not performed under duress be-
cause it is not responsive to a threat of unlawful force. Nor does it
qualify as a choice of evils because the harm or evil sought to be
avoided is less than or equal to that sought to be prevented by the
law defining the offense.9 9 Some commentators would correct the
apparent injustice that results from this apparent oversight by creat-
ing a new defense of situational compulsion or personal neces-
sity.' 00 In actual legal practice, of course, a new defense need not
be created before defendants escape conviction for saving them-
selves or their friends and relatives. The familiar approach in An-
glo-American law is to entrust the discretion of prosecutors not to
bring charges. This strategy remains the preferred alternative when
sympathies favor defendants who commit offenses but whose con-
duct does not correspond to an existing defense.' 0l
97 Of course, this claim does not entail that such sacrifices would not be permitted, or
that persons who make them would not be heroic.
98 See supra note 93. See also Morawetz, supra note 3, at 298.
99 Italian law recognizes a defense of duress in some situations in which-the harm
sought to be avoided by apparently violating the law is not less than that sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense. See McAuley, The Theory of Justification and
Excuse: Some Italian Lessons, 35 AM.J. CoMP. L. 359, 362 n.8 (1987).
100 See the discussion in P. Low, J. JEFFRIES, & R. BONNIE, CRIMINAL LAW 622-23 (2d
ed. 1986).
101 This alternative continues to be applied in many cases of beneficent euthanasia.*
See Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed 'Mercy-Killing' Legislation, 42 MINN.
L. REv. 969 (1958).
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Contemporary theorists are appropriately hesitant to rely upon
discretion to achieve justice in such cases, denouncing its use as un-
principled. 10 2 Instead, the response that has attracted the greatest
support among commentators is to excuse rather than tojzutify such
behavior. Andrew Von Hirsch contends that "in view of the over-
riding interest a person understandably has in preserving his own
existence, he is not to blame for a law violation when compliance
would have meant his own death."' 0 3 Presumably Von Hirsch
would extend this rationale to situations in which a mother violates
a law to save her infant instead of herself, for persons have "over-
riding interests" to "preserve the existence" of their immediate
families as well as themselves. And this "overriding interest" per-
sists even in situations in which the persons sacrificed outnumber
the persons saved.
Once it is admitted that the basis for a defense for the mother is
that the law should not demand certain kinds of sacrifices, there is
less reason to suppose that such hypotheticals can be resolved by a
balancing of competing interests.104 Of course, some delicate ques-
tions of interest balancing will remain; limited partiality is limited.
But the central problem is not whether the gains of apparently vio-
lating the criminal law outweigh the benefits of compliance, but
whether the sacrifice of conformity to law is too great to require.
The most difficult issue is not to determine how to balance com-
peting values, but rather to identify those interests that the criminal
law should not demand that persons sacrifice.' 0 5
Von Hirsch's reasoning draws the wrong conclusion from the
right premise. If the criminal law is to acknowledge "a person's
understandable preference for his own life or safety,"10 6 as surely it
should, 0 7 the central question is whether conduct that exemplifies
102 The attack on the use of prosecutorial discretion as an alternative to the applica-
tion of principle has been led by Fletcher. See Fletcher, Some Unwise Reflections About Dis-
cretion, LAw & CoNTEmp. PROBS., Autumn 1984, at 269.
103 Von Hirsch, Lifeboat Law, GRuM. JusT. ETmics, Summer/Fall 1985, at 88, 91.
104 Thus, there is little reason to follow the German approach that distinguishes be-
tween necessity as a justification, when the gain of apparently violating the law out-
weighs the gain of compliance, and necessity as an excuse, when the gain of apparently
violating the law does not outweigh the gain of compliance. See Gur-Arye, Should the
Ctiminal Law Distinguish Between Necessity as aJustification and Necessity as an Excuse?, 102 LAw
Q. REv. 71 (1986).
105 See German Penal Code of 1975 § 34, quoted in Gur-Arye, supra note 104, at 72
(defense of justifying necessity requires a threat to "life, limb, liberty or any legal
interest").
106 Von Hirsch, supra note 103, at 93.
107 The criminal law must somehow acknowledge this sentiment to avoid conviction in
such notorious cases as Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884) (Seamen
stranded on high seas convicted of murder for killing another seaman to eat his flesh,
1989] 513
DOUGLAS N. HUSAK
this preference should be excused rather than justified. If the basis
for the defense is that some sacrifices are too great for the law to
require, the plea resembles a justification more closely than an ex-
cuse. If the defense were an excuse, the sacrifice would be required,
although persons would not be blameworthy for their failure to per-
form their duty. Von Hirsch rejects this alternative, although not
for utilitarian reasons.108 Instead, he invokes Kant in support of the
conclusion that, from an objective point of view, "each person's life
is as important as the lives of other persons. Hence, it is not just to
sacrifice A's existence in order to promote the interests-or even, to
save the lives-of B, C, and D.' 0 9 Thus Von Hirsch concludes that
the mother's action is wrongful, and her defense must be an excuse,
not a justification.
The Kantian principle that each life is of equal objective impor-
tance has two interpretations-the first obviously true, the second
doubtful. Surely one life is as objectively valuable as another in the
sense that any given individual should be prohibited to sacrifice it in
order to save another. But it is less clear that no one should be per-
mitted to sacrifice it to save another. Arguably, those who stand in a
"special relationship" to the threatened individual may be permit-
ted to do so. At least, nothing in the Kantian principle clearly pre-
cludes this conclusion. If "objectivity" is construed to require that
special relationships between parties not be taken into account in
making moral and legal judgments, the objectivity principle distorts
rather than expresses our intuitions about such circumstances.
There is a danger that reflection about these hypotheticals will
be unduly influenced by the fact that they involve the loss of one or
more lives. The position that killings cannot be justified by necessity,
embraced by the common law but rejected by the Model Penal
Code,' 10 is extraordinarily common. Of course, few cases in which
questions about justifications arise involve death. But there is no
need to formulate special rules for those rare cases in which one or
more life is lost, as the basis for favoring special rules about death
collapses in the context of self-defense." In most situations, the
victim killed in self-defense is an unlawful aggressor, but of course
although that was only chance of survival). Somejudicial opinions recommend an exec-
utive pardon.
108 He reasons that "once one begins to doubt a purely utilitarian theory ofjustice...
it becomes questionable whether such killings could ever be justified." Von Hirsch,
supra note 103, at 90.
109 Id. at 90.
1O See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 commentary at 15 (1985).




he need not be so. Consider Judith Thomson's colorful example of
an innocent child strapped to the front of a tank attacking a defend-
ant armed with an anti-tank gun.'" 2 If the killing of an innocent per-
son is justified in such predicaments," 3 why not also in cases of
necessity? In both situations, persons act from "overriding inter-
ests" to "preserve their existence." To deem such conduct wrong-
ful might avoid complications for a theory ofjustifications, but raises
comparable difficulties for a theory of excuses. 14
If an adequate theory of justifications should accommodate
rather than reject limited partiality, it is clear that one of several
fatal defects with utilitarianism is that it prohibits such favoritism,
even in everyday circumstances in which no criminal lawjustification
is required. The theory fails to explain why persons are entitled to
prefer their own interests over those of others, and allowed to relax
at a movie rather than required to work to alleviate world suffering.
In addition, the theory fails to explain why persons are entitled to
prefer the interests of their friends and relatives over those of stran-
gers. More generally, utilitarianism cannot account for the signifi-
cance of "special relationships." In focusing entirely upon
consequences, it neglects the particular agent who brought them
about. But it makes a great deal of difference who is diverting a
tram, and what her relationship is to potential victims. In focusing
entirely upon results and ignoring the significance of the relation-
ship between the parties involved, utilitarianism makes extraordi-
nary demands upon persons. Conduct normally believed to be
beyond the call of duty (or superogatory) becomes obligatory;" t5
thus the theory collapses distinctions made in everyday thought. A
theory that requires persons to maximize welfare, utility, or prefer-
ence satisfaction, depending upon the particular version of utilitari-
anism that is favored, can be applied to show that each of us is
violating duties at almost every instant. Of course, much philosoph-
ical ingenuity has been expended by (those few remaining) defend-
ers of utilitarianism to overcome this objection, but no attempt has
112 See J. THOMSON, Self-Defense and Rights, in RiGrrs, RESTITUTION, AND RISK 33
(1986).
113 But see Alexander, Justifications and Innocent Aggressors, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1177
(1987).
114 The assimilation of cases of necessity into a theory of excuse is more or less prob-
lematic depending upon what theory of excuses is defended. Categorization of necessity
as an excuse does not fit comfortably into any of the theories of excuse mentioned in
note 30. Perhaps such difficulties illustrate Greenawalt's point about the futility of at-
tempting to categorize each case as a justification or excuse.
115 For Williams' development of this criticism, see supra note 64.
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proved remotely convincing. 116
According to the two interpretations considered thus far, the
requirement that justifications be objective does not support the
conclusions said to be derived from it: it does not preclude limited
partiality, and provides no reason to reject the possibility that a mis-
take about a justification might result in justified conduct. Objectiv-
ity might be preserved in either of the two senses discussed above.
The "true" moral theory, whatever its content, might identify such
conduct as justified. And such conduct might satisfy the universal-
izability requirement; all persons in similar circumstances might be
entitled to behave similarly.
Sometimes the objectivity requirement is construed in neither
of the above senses, but is understood to mean something like
"right by virtue of its consequences." Perhaps this meaning under-
lties the Fletcher-Robinson commitment to the mistake thesis.'
1 7
Admittedly, the consequences of such conduct are bad; for example,
an innocent person may be killed in an act of putative self-defense.
But why should "objectivity" be solely a function of consequences?
It is not persuasive to reply by pointing out the inadequacy of a the-
ory that construes rightness solely in virtue of intentions. 18 The
more plausible view is that rightness is a complicated mixture of
consequences and intentions." 19 Thus, good intentions do not suf-
116 Utilitarians have attempted to justify our preferences to ourselves, friends and rel-
atives by attempting to show how such favoritism frequently promotes the'greatest good
in the long run. They point out that we are in a better position to benefit ourselves than
others, and that a tireless commitment to the general welfare is so draining as to leave us
unfit to perform it for any appreciable length of time. See H. SIDGWICK, THE METHODS
OF ETHiCS 431 (7th ed. 1907). It seems doubtful that such arguments will justify the full
extent of the favoritism we are warranted in showing ourselves. Moreover, it seems false
"that the permissibility of devoting energy to one's projects and commitments depends
on the efficacy of such activity as an instrument of overall benefit." S. SCHEFFLER, supra
note 92, at 17.
A closely related strategy is to try to incorporate favoritism into a more sophisti-
cated consequentialist account. Robinson argues that inasmuch as autonomy is an im-
portant value, "there is no apparent reason why interest-balancing must fail to consider
[it]." 1 P. ROBINSON, supra note 2, at 85 n.7. Fletcher counters that the "commitment to
the dignity of the individual is betrayed by reducing the value of autonomy to one inter-
est among many in the calculus of utility." G. FLETCHER, supra note 2, at 771.
117 See 2 P. ROBINSON, supra note 2, at 7-8.
[J]ustification principles... are stated in a purely objective form, without any men-
tion of the actor's subjective mental state. This is entirely consistent with the theory
ofjustification ... [according to which] conduct is justified when, despite its apparent
violation of a criminal prohibition, it does not cause a net harm.
Id.
118 See Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, supra note 4, at 974.
119 See Morawetz, supra note 3, at 285 (discussion about why an adequate theory of
justification must incorporate both utilitarian and "retributive" elements); see also D.
HUSAK, supra note 7, at 122-55 (discussion. of the mental component of crime).
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fice to make conduct justified, but neither do good consequences.
"Objective" rightness, if understood to mean "right in virtue of its
consequences," simply is not rightness.
This section has described two potential deficiencies in a utilita-
rian theory ofjustifications. First, persons who are mistaken about a
justification might well be justified rather than excused, notwith-
standing the fact that their conduct creates a net balance of harm
over good. Second, the scope of the permissible has been shown to
be sensitive to special, role-differentiated relationships between per-
sons, and neither the objectivity nor impartiality requirements pre-
clude moral or legal theory from justifying conduct that exhibits
limited partiality. Thus utilitarianism has no more plausibility as a
theory ofjustifications than as a theory of morality.
IV. ACCESSORIAL LIABILrrY
What are the consequences of the above conclusions for the
problem of accessorial liability? In short, the implications of these
arguments are devastating for the project of resolving each dispute
about the liability of accessories by categorizing DI 's defense as a
justification or an excuse. If it is true that D1 's conduct is com-
mendable and praiseworthy-and not merely according to utilita-
rian standards-then it is likely that D2 should be permitted to
assist. However, as the preceding discussion indicates, not all cases
in which D1 is justified in apparently violating a criminal law con-
form to this model.
Theorists should have been uneasy in attempting to identify the
rights of D2 to assist by reference to how D1 's defense is catego-
rized. It is noteworthy that D2 cannot know whether he has a right to
assist D1 unless he knows that D1 has ajustification for his apparent
violation of law. If D1 is merely excused, D2 has no right to assist;
his assistance cannot be justified, but (at best) excused. Thus, D2
cannot ascertain his ights unless he knows what type of defense D1
possesses. Of course, frequently D2 cannot know what type of de-
fense D1 possesses; therefore, he must guess whether D1 has a justifi-
cation or an excuse.' 20
These results are problematic on the ground described
above. 121 It is peculiar for a theory to assign or withhold rights from
parties from an "omniscient" point of view, requiring information
120 Sometimes his fate may depend upon whether he has guessed correctly. See the
questionable decision in People v. Young, 11 N.Y.2d 274, 183 N.E.2d 319, 229 N.Y.S.2d
1 (1962) (defendant who intervened in good faith in a struggle between a person and a
policeman in civilian dress attempting to arrest that person was convicted of assault).
121 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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that could not be available to the parties who must choose. Deci-
sions about what rights persons possess should be made within a
theory of action morality. If a function of a theory of action morality
is to guide conduct, there is good reason to reject a view that with-
holds judgment until what cannot be known is eventually discov-
ered. A person must be permitted to act on the basis of information
available to him at the moment of decision. The alternative is that a
theory of action morality will offer him no practical advice. A theory
that offers no useful guidance is clearly inferior to a competitive the-
ory that contains a principle that could be followed. The only.judg-
ment that D2 can make with confidence is that he has a right not to
assist D1; thus, D2 is well advised to err on the side of caution. It is
questionable whether the doctrines of the criminal law should be
construed to encourage conservatism.
More importantly, the moral argument in favor of allowing
assistance from D2 whenever Dl is justified crumbles when "justifi-
cation" is construed as "permissible" rather than as "commenda-
ble." If Dl 's conduct were commendable, it is plausible to suppose
that the law should not discourage, and might actually encourage,
assistance from others, notwithstanding the fact that Dl 's conduct
apparently violates a criminal law. But these results do not follow if
D1 's conduct is merely tolerable. The law need not encourage, and
might actively discourage, assistance with conduct that it is willing to
permit.122
This conclusion is reinforced if utilitarianism is abandoned as a
theory of justification, and the law permits conduct that expresses a
person's partiality toward himself or his friends. If conduct is "ob-
jectively justified" in virtue of its consequences, and DI 's conduct
produces a net balance of good over evil, then D2 should be en-
couraged to assist in the production of these consequences. But
conduct might be justified even though it produces no more good
than evil. The judgment that the mother is permitted to divert the
tram from her infant daughter is not grounded on the supposition
that her conduct produces a net gain of utility, but rather in her
"special, role-differentiated relationship" to her daughter that cre-
ates interests she should not be required to sacrifice.
Because the criminal law should not require great sacrifice, and
is willing to tolerate conduct that expresses DI 's partiality toward
his friends, relatives, or himself, it does not entail that any other
person-perhaps a total stranger-should be permitted to assist him
122 Fletcher seemingly admits as much. See Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, supra
note 4, at 977.
[Vol. 80
JUSTIFICATIONS AND ACCESSORIES
in acts exhibiting such favoritism. The rationale that applies to
whether a defense for the stranger should be recognized is entirely
different from the rationale that pertains to the mother: unlike the
mother, total strangers make no greater sacrifice in watching the
tram kill one innocent victim rather than another. It makes little
sense for the law to allow or encourage any D2, who bears no special
relation to D1, to assist her. Thus the proper classification of D1 's
defense as a justification is not dispositive of the issue of D2 's liabil-
ity as an accessory.
Whether D2 should be allowed to assist (or interfere) with D1 is
a matter of extraordinary complexity, depending upon, inter alia, the
relationship between the parties, including the relationship to the
victim of their apparent criminal conduct. 123 This result coheres
with ordinary thinking about how morality is sensitive to changes in
the relationships between the parties involved. Suppose that D1 is
about to kill V in an act ofjustified self-defense in DI 's home, from
which he has no duty to retreat. If D2, who is V's husband, forces
D1 to safely retreat against his will, D2 's relationship to V might
make his conduct permissible when no relationship with V would
not.124 Such cases illustrate the pitfalls in attempts to derive the
rights of D2 from the rights of D1 to act in his own behalf.
Armed with these insights, it is instructive to return to the diffi-
cult hypothetical in Part I: D1 enlists the help of D2 in burglarizing
X's house to prevent V from making good his threat to bloody the
nose of one of Dl 's children. Presumably, D1 should not be re-
quired to sacrifice his son's interest for that of X. Whether D2
should be permitted to assist depends upon whether his friendship
to D1 qualifies as a "special, role-differentiated relationship," and, if
so, whether his assistance exceeds any limitations placed upon his
expression of partiality. To ask this question is not to answer it, but
rather to indicate the direction in which the solution to many
problems of accessorial liability is to be found. The answer is not a
simple function of the proper classification of Dl 's defense as ajus-
tification or an excuse. What is required in addition to categorizing
DI 's defense is a theory of special relationships between accesso-
ries, principals, and potential victims. For the reasons described
above, an adequate theory of role-differentiated behavior will not be
consequentialist or utilitarian. Defending a theory will prove diffi-
123 See Gur-Arye, supra note 104, at 85.
124 See Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, supra note 3, at 1925; Greenawalt, Justifications
and Excuses, supra note 3, at 107. In both articles, Greenawalt mentions a similar case, but
he laments that "there are limits to the number of factors that the law can sensibly con-
sider." Greenawalt, Justifications and Excuses, supra note 3, at 107.
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cult. But in its absence, no comprehensive solution to the problem
of accessorial liability will be forthcoming.
